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NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW - CRIMINAL NEGLECT OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD - PROOF OF PATERNITY IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
Defendant was prosecuted in the Juvenile Court for the Par-
ish of Orleans under article 74 of the Louisiana Criminal Code'
for failure to support his illegitimate child. The court held that
it was without jurisdiction under the State Constitution2 to fix
responsibility for support of illegitimate children; and, until
the obligation of support was established by a judgment of a
civil district court or by a formal acknowledgment by the parent,
a juvenile court could not inquire into the matter of criminal
responsibility. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court, with
three justices dissenting, held, affirmed. Since the determina-
tion of paternity is a civil function, the legislative enactments
which permit proof of paternity of an illegitimate child in a
prosecution brought in the Juvenile Court for the Parish of
Orleans for criminal neglect of children8 are inconsistent with
the constitutional provision that grants to the District Court
1. LA. R.S. 14:74 (1950) provides: "Criminal neglect of family is the desertion
or intentional non-support:
"(1) By a husband of his wife who is in destitute or necessitous circumstances;
or
"(2) By either parent of his minor child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
who is in destitute or necessitous circumstances, there being a duty established by
this article for either parent to support his child. The parent shall have this duty
without regard to his reasons and irrespective of the causes of his living separate
from the other parent. The duty established by this article shall apply retro-
spectively to all children, legitimate or illegitimate, born prior to the effective date
of this article.
"In the case of an illegitimate child, evidence may be introduced in the pro-
ceedings hereunder to prove paternity or maternity. This proof shall be made in
accordance with the rules established by the REVISED CIVIL CODE of 1870, as
amended, as for proof of paternity or maternity for civil purposes. Such proof, how-
ever, shall be used solely as the basis for the duty to support an ilegitimate child
established by this article, and shall not be construed as establishing any civil
obligation.
"Whenever a husband has left his wife or minor child in destitute or necessitous
circumstances and has not provided them with means of support within sixty days
thereafter, his failure to so provide shall be presumptive evidence for the purpose
of determining the substantive elements of this offense that at the time of leaving
he intended desertion and non-support.
"Whoever commits the offense of criminal neglect of family shall be fined not
more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both;
and if a fine should be imposed, the court may direct it to be paid in whole or in
part to the wife, or to the tutor or custodian of the minor child or children, or to
an organization or individual approved by the courts as fiduciary for such wife
or child. As amended Acts 1952, No. 368, § 1."
2. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 96.
3. LA. R.S. 14:74, 14:74.1 (1950).
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for the Parish of Orleans its exclusive original civil jurisdiction. 4
State v. Hubbard, 228 La. 155, 81 So.2d 844 (1955).
The definition of the crime of criminal neglect of family was
enlarged by the Legislature in 1950 to include illegitimate child-
dren5 so that the Louisiana Department of Public Welfare could
be relieved of the burden of supporting a child whose father's
identity could be determined. A total of 21,424 illegitimate
children 6 were then the responsibility of the welfare agency. In
enacting the amendment, the Legislature apparently intended to
permit an illegitimate child to prove his paternal descent in the
same proceeding in which the alleged father was prosecuted for
non-support;7 however, that intention was not expressly indi-
cated in the amendment. During the two years following the
enactment, the Supreme Court held" that as a prerequisite to
the commission of the crime of non-support of an illegitimate
child, paternity must be established by a legal acknowledgment
or by a judgment in a civil suit, as provided by article 242 of the
Civil Code.9 In 1952, the Legislature amended the criminal neglect
statute to provide specifically that proof of paternity should be
allowed as a part of the criminal prosecution." However, in a 1954
case," the Supreme Court rendered the change in the statute
ineffective by reaffirming its earlier decisions. The Legislature
then reasserted its position by passing act 289 of 195412 which
4. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 81.
5. La. Acts 1950, No. 164, p. 330, now LA. R.S. 14:74 (1950).
6. LA. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE, A STUDY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN CASELOAD RECEIVING ASSISTANCE IN LOUISIANA
IN JANUARY 1950, table 17, p. 18 (1950).
7. For a more detailed history of this statute see: Bennett, Survey of 1954
Louisiana Legislation- Criminal Law and Procedure, and Penal Institutions, 15
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 1, 55 (1954) ; The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court
for the 1951-1952 Term - Persons, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 230, 261 (1953) ;
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-Criminal
Law, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 230, 247 (1953) ; Louisiana Legislation of 1952,
13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 21, 59 (1952) ; Comment, Criminal Liability for Non-
Support of an Illegitimate Child, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 301 (1952).
8. State v. Sims, 220 La. 532, 57 So.2d 177 (1952) ; State v. Jones, 220 La.
381, 56 So.2d 724 (1951) ; State v. Randall, 219 La. 578, 53 So.2d 689 (1951).
9. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 242 (1870).
10. La. Acts 1952, No. 368, p. 920, amended LA. R.S. 14:74 (1950) to provide
in part: "In the case of an illegitimate child, evidence may be introduced in the
proceedings hereunder to prove paternity or maternity. This proof shall be made
in accordance with the rules established by the Revised Civil Code of 1870, as
amended, as for proof of paternity or maternity for civil purposes. Such proof,
however, shall be used solely as the basis for the duty to support an illegitimate
child established by this article, and shall not be construed as establishing any
civil obligation."
11. State v. Mack, 224 La. 886, 71 So.2d 315 (1954).
12. LA. R.S. 14:74.1 (1950) : "The provisions of Art. 242 of the Louisiana
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unequivocally provided that a prosecution under Criminal Code
article 74 for the criminal neglect of an illegitimate child is not
dependent upon a previous formal acknowledgment or civil ad-
judication establishing paternity.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court found that the Juve-
nile Court for the Parish of Orleans does not have jurisdiction
to "entertain a case to establish the paternity of the subject
child and fix responsibility for his support."' 8 Its decision is
based on an interpretation of section 81 of article 7 of the Lou-
isiana Constitution, which states in part: "The Civil District
Court of the Parish of Orleans is hereby vested with the same
exclusive original civil jurisdiction as that of District Courts
throughout the State, as fixed by this Constitution at the time of
its adoption, except such as may be vested by it in other courts in
the City of New Orleans." (Emphasis added.) 1 4 Since this sec-
tion provides for an exception to the exclusive civil jurisdiction
of the District Court for the Parish of Orleans, the provision of
the Constitution which establishes jurisdiction of the Juvenile
Court for the Parish of Orleans15 had to be interpreted. The
court concluded: "With the exception of the amendment of 1938
giving jurisdiction to the Juvenile Court for the Parish of Or-
leans of adoption proceedings, the article of the Constitution as
originally enacted, and the several amendments thereto, clearly
show that the Court has no jurisdiction over civil matters."
(Emphasis added.)1 6 Less than a year prior to the instant de-
cision the court unanimously interpreted this section differently
when it declared in Freeman v. Freeman:17 "We also find no
substance in the plea to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court
for the Parish of Orleans which is grounded on the contention
that the Court's jurisdiction '* * * of all cases of desertion or
non-support of children by either parent, * * *' (see Section 96
of Article 7 of the Constitution) is limited to criminal proceed-
ings brought under LSA-R.S. 14.74. Obviously, the grant of
jurisdiction 'of all cases of desertion or non-support' includes
civil as well as criminal." (Emphasis added.) Although the Su-
preme Court did not mention specifically the Freeman case in
Revised Civil Code of 1870 shall not apply to any proceeding brought under the
provisions of R.S. 14:74."
13. State v. Hubbard, 228 La. 155, 81 So.2d 844, 847 (1955).
14. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 81.
15. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 90.
16. State v. H ubbard, 228 La. 155, 81 So.2d 844, 847 (1955).
17. 226 La. 410, 415, 76 So.2d 414, 416 (1954).
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the instant decision, it evidently intends to abandon the inter-
pretation of section 96 of article 7 of the Constitution announced
in that case. The present case appears to be one of those in-
stances in which a state statute is construed as conflicting with
the State Constitution because the majority of the court dis-
agrees with the policy expressed in the statute.18 This conclu-
sion becomes evident by the following statement made by the
court: "We think it would be most illogical to convict the de-
fendant of neglect of family, which of necessity required him
to be decreed to be the father of such illegitimate child who,
under our substantive law, belongs to no family, and simul-
taneously hold that the defendant deserted a child who had never
been under his custody and intentionally failed to support a child
when theretofore there had been no such liability established." 19
The effect of the present case is to leave a needy illegitimate
child without a practical method of obtaining alimony from his
father; therefore, the child remains the burden of the state.
Since a civil action is still required to establish the paternal
descent of an illegitimate child, some practical civil procedure
should be considered to implement the result desired by the
Legislature. Legal aid bureaus and forma pauperis proceedings
are presently available, but only a negligible number of paternity
cases can be handled in this manner due to the limited number
of legal aid bureaus and the small percentage of lawyers who
have sufficient time to try cases without remuneration. A statute
permitting the state to initiate suit for proof of paternity would
be effective, but costly. The state would be forced to employ
additional attorneys to dispose of the large number of cases
involving unacknowledged illegitimate children who are now re-
ceiving aid through the state's public assistance program. Al-
though the expense incurred would be more than justified by
the eventual tremendous reduction of the amount currently ex-
pended by the Department of Public Welfare in supporting these
children, 20 this additional expense should not be incurred if there
18. Other state supreme courts have exercised similar power in other fields
of legislation. See Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the
States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91 (1950).
19. State v. Hubbard, 228 La. 155, 81 So.2d 844, 848 (1955).
20. During the period beginning on July 26, 1950, the date LA. R.S. 14:74
(1950) was extended to include illegitimates, and ending on June 30, 1955, the
date of the instant decision, the sum of $74,276,569.30 was expended by the Louisi-
ana Department of Public Welfare in aid to dependent children. 14 LA. DEP'T
PUB. WELFARE ANN. REP. table 6, at 20 (1950-1951), 15 LA. DEP'T PUB. WELFARE
ANN. REP. table 6, at 22 (1951-1952), 16 LA. DEP'T PUB. WELFARE ANN. REP.
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are other methods by which the same results can be obtained.
For example, one means of avoiding this expense would be to
allow the district attorneys to represent the state in these civil
proceedings as they do in certain other civil matters.
It may well be, the Supreme Court based its instant decision
on a belief that the convicted person in a prosecution for criminal
neglect of children should not be placed in jail for failing to sup-
port a child that had not been legally declared his own. If so,
the court's objection could be met by amending the penalty
clause of R.S. 14:74 to provide that if there has been no prior
formal acknowledgment or adjudication of paternity, the sen-
tence must be suspended on condition that the parent provide
alimony for his "discovered" child. In effect, this would codify
and make mandatory what can presently be done by a trial
court if it applies R.S. 14:7521 and R.S. 15:53022 in connection
with R.S. 14:74.23 Since the Juvenile Court for the Parish of
table 6, at 20 (1952-1953), 17 LA. DEP'T PuB. WELFARE ANN. REP. table 3, at 28
(1953-1954), 18 LA. DEP'T PUB. WELFARE ANN. REP. table 3, at 26 (1954-1955).
Approximately 27.4% of the total expenditures went to illegitimates. LA. DEP'T
PUB. WELFARE, A STUDY OF RESOURCES, INCOMES AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF RECIPIENTS OF AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN IN LOUISIANA-1954 table 15,
at 21 (1954). Each month, additional expenditures are made to dependent children
by the Department of Public Welfare thereby steadily increasing the sum paid
to illegitimate children. If even a small percentage of the payments to illegitimate
children could be stopped now, by forcing those children's fathers to support them,
the long run saving would be a very sizable figure.
21. LA. R.S. 14:75 (1950) states in part: "Before the trial for criminal neglect
of family (with the consent of the defendant), or after conviction, instead of im-
posing the punishment hereinbefore provided, or in addition thereto, the court, in
its discretion, having regard to the circumstances and financial ability of the de-
fendant, shall have the power to issue an order directing the defendant to pay a
certain sum weekly or at such periods as the court may direct, to the wife, or to
the tutor or custodian of the minor child, or to an organization or individual ap-
proved by the court as fiduciary for such wife or child, which sum may be increased
or decreased by the court from time to time, as the circumstances may require; and
with authority to require the defendant to enter into a recognizance, with or
without surety, as the court shall direct, in order to insure the payment of the
alimony. The condition of the recognizance shall be such that if the defendant
shall make his or her personal appearance at court whenever ordered to do so,
and shall further comply with the terms of the order or of any subsequent modifi-
cation thereof, then the recognizance shall be void, otherwise of full force and
effect."
22. LA. R.S. 15:530 (1950) states in part: "While on probation, ... [an
offender] may be required by the court to provide for support of any persons for
whose support he is legally responsible . ...
"In placing an offender ... on probation, the court in its discretion may direct
that such offender be under the supervision of the state department of wel-
fare . ... "
23. The Supreme Court also indicated in the instant decision that the pre-
sumptions of paternity contained in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 might be
destroyed if prosecutions were allowed under R.S. 14:74. To alleviate this concern,
R.S. 14:74 could be amended to expressly preclude contraventions of those pre-
sumptions of paternity.
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Orleans is denied constitutional jurisdiction to establish paternity
in civil cases as well as in prosecutions under R.S. 14:74 by
the present decision, a constitutional amendment will be neces-
sary if it is desired that the juvenile court exercise jurisdiction
over such cases.24 Regardless of whether an adequate civil rem-
edy is provided or the criminal procedure is revised to meet the
Supreme Court's objection, it is important that some procedure
be made available to impose the burden of supporting the
illegitimate offspring of known fathers on those parents rather
than on a welfare agency of the state.
Jack Brittain
CRIMINAL LAW - FELONY-MURDER - KILLING OF CO-FELON
In the retreat from a store at which they had committed
armed robbery, two felons were pursued by the proprietor, who
fatally shot one of them. The surviving felon was indicted under
the felony-murder statute. The lower court sustained the de-
fendant's demurrer to the evidence, and the Commonwealth ap-
pealed. Held, reversed.' "The killing of the co-felon is the
natural foreseeable result of the initial act. The robbery was
the proximate cause of the death."'2 Commonwealth v. Thomas,
382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
The felony-murder doctrine is a fiction developed in the
common law of England to charge with murder those engaged
in a dangerous felony from which any death results.3 The re-
quirement of malice for common law murder is fulfilled under
the felony-murder doctrine by ascribing to the felon who only
incidentally kills the malice of the lesser felony. 4 Historically
the felony-murder doctrine seems to have been limited at first
solely to the acts committed by the felon himself." This was the
original and long-standing interpretation of the doctrine in the
United States." Thus, when the instigators of a riot were on
24. In order to insure all juvenile courts equal jurisdiction over these cases,
LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 52, 53, 96, should also be amended.
1. Three of the seven justices dissented.
2. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 645, 117 A.2d 204, 206 (1955).
3. A discussion of the origin and reason for the doctrine can be found in
Hitchler, The Killer and His Victim in Felony-Murder Cases, 53 DICK. L. REv.
3 (1948).
4. Ibid.
5. 3 COKE, INSTITUTES 56 (1797) ; 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 192 (1769).
6. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905) ; Commonwealth
v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541, 83 Am. Dec. 705 (1863) ; Commonwealth v. Thompson,
321 Pa. 327, 184 At]. 97 (1936) ; Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 210 (1950).
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